Florida Philosophical Review

Vol. II.1, Summer 2002

Volume II, Number 1

Summer 2002

Copyright 2006 by The University of Central Florida: ISSN 1535-3656

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Table of Contents

  1. Editors' Introduction by Shelly Park and Nancy Stanlicki
  2. "The Arrangement of the Soul: Philosophy and the Professional Philosopher Presidential Address to the 47th Annual Meeting of the Florida Philosophical Association" by Kirk Ludwig5
  3. "Aristotle and Supervenience Physicalism Winner of the 2001 FPA Graduate Essay Award" by Jeremy Kirby11
  4. "Hempel on Intertheoretic Reduction Winner of the Gerritt and Edith Schipper Undergraduate Award for Outstanding Undergraduate Paper" by David Barnett26

Symposium I: Martin Schönfeld's The Philosophy of the Young Kant

  1. "The Precritical Kant and So Much More" by Jennifer Uleman41
  2. "Dreams and Freedom" by Byron Williston46
  3. "Some Questions on Negation and Possibility" by Sidney Axinn53
  4. "Response to Commentaries" by Martin Schönfeld60

Symposium II: Alfred Mele's Self-Deception Unmasked

  1. "Three Levels of Self-Deception" by Peter Dalton72
  2. "Capturing Our Attitude Toward the Self-Deceived" by Crystal Thorpe77
  3. "Some Remarks on Self-Deception: Mele, Moore and Lakatos" by Risto Hilpinen82
  4. "Reply to Commentators" by Alfred Mele98
  5. Notes on Contributors102
Abstract: Aristotle and Supervenience Physicalism

In an article entitled “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? A Draft,” Myles Burnyeat suggested that we might do “what the seventeenth century did . . . [with the Aristotelian concept of the mind] . . . junk it.” Burnyeat buttressed this controversial claim, in large part, on the premise that it is difficult to believe that mental facts are not supervenient on physical facts in the wake of post-enlightenment thinking. Various valiant attempts to save Aristotle’s philosophy of mind from being junked soon followed. One strategy that found favor among some scholars was that of arguing that Aristotle’s physics really is not in conflict with the idea that mental facts supervene upon physical facts. Scholars such as Michael Wedin and Victor Caston read Aristotle as maintaining a supervenience thesis in Physics 7.3. I disagree with the view that ascribes supervenience physicalism to Aristotle. The general strategy for providing support for my view is as follows: I first aim to discredit the view that ascribes supervenience physicalism to Aristotle on the basis of Physics 7.3. Thereafter, I turn to more psychological and biological texts to argue that Aristotle’s central views therein are unfriendly to supervenience physicalism.

Abstract: Hempel on Intertheoretic Reduction

The question of whether all living things are really just complex physical ones, or whether instead there are biological entities or characteristics that cannot be fully characterized in physical terms, has historical roots buried centuries deep. Carl Hempel considers this question as an empirical one for modern science to address. Hempel’s concern is not with the answer to the question, but rather with the methods by which it may be evaluated. He considers the position of those he calls “mechanists,” that all living things and their biological characteristics are nothing more than complex physical systems, as equivalent to the view that in some significant sense all accurate biological theories are implied by physical ones. In so doing, Hempel seeks to draw conclusions regarding the unity of science more broadly. This paper argues that Hempel’s account, though perhaps succeeding in a crucial first step, fails on numerous points afterwards. Using the morals that may be draw from these failures, I suggest rough outlines of some alternative accounts of intertheoretic reduction.

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